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The Teacher's Role 1n
Liberal Education
By

JAMES REDFIELD

M an is a very poor sort of animal ; our posture is awkward, our
digestion weak, and our instincts unreliable. Since we have been so
poorly gifted by na ture we must rely upon the great elaboration of
culture. Men must be taught almost everything; to walk, to talk, to
make love. Humanity itself is a cultural product: an untaught m an
is not a man a t all. Therefore, education is not just one among
other problems of the human sphere; rather the problem of human life
is itself the problem of education. When we hea r someone say that
this or that social problem can be solved by education we know that
the writer has not been able to find a solution ; he is saying that if
people were better the problem would not exist. Education is the
process by which people become better than they a re.
If we are to talk of education, therefore, we must m ake some
distinctions, and a distinction can only be m ade according to a principle. Americans a re practical people a nd we usually start our inquiry
on practical principles. We ask: wha t does this or that bit of education
enable man to do? And we find ourselves dividing general educationwhich teaches the skills everyone must have-from specialized education-which teaches particular skills a nd enables m en to find various
slots within the division of labor.
Thus we m ay say that everyone should be able to read, write, and
calcula te; we might go further and say that everyone should be able
to read critically, write elegantly, and calculate with some comprehension of the principles of ma thema tical thought. These skills are
useful in any line of work, or at least in a ny middle-class activity;
therefore at this stage in his education the student does not h ave to
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ask what he will do with his learning. Later the demands of the
market and this or that private sense of vocation will draw different
men into different careers-one becomes a carpenter, another a
philosopher. Here their educations diverge and they learn the skills of
their private mysteries.
These practical principles, however, will never bring us to the
question of liberal education. They are essentially servile; they see
education as a response to the needs of use. Every time we are told
that this or that education reform is desirable because America needs
engineers-or, for that matter, because America needs poets-the
idea of liberal education is in danger. Liberal Education does not
concern itself with the process by which people come to be able to
do what is required of them; liberal education is the process by
which people come to be excellent. Servile education makes a man
useful to other people; liberal education makes him satisfactory to
himself.
Human excellence is various, and so, therefore, is liberal education.
I make a rough division into three types.
In the first place there is education for character-the process by
which men become courageous, self-controlled, truthful, responsive,
responsible, and so on. The family has always been the chief educator
in this line, supported by various quasi-families-schools, churches, and
so on. The primary mode of learning is through imitation; morals, as
we all know, are best taught by example. Some loved and esteemed
figure- preferably a parent-becomes the model. Ethical education is
therefore by nature conservative; through imitation the virtues-and
for that matter the vices-of one generation are, more or less,
recreated in the next.
Secondly there is education for action-or, as we now call it,
socialization. The excellence of a man does not lie simply in acting well,
but also in acting freely, taking part in the human world through
competition and cooperation. The classical prototype of free activity
is political deliberation, which means not only the solution of problems
but also the creation of values through the process of consensus and
dissent, through debate. Such free activity, however, is not limited to
the life of the state; it takes place wherever men are joined on a basis
of quality in a structured group.
Imagine, for instance, a small theatrical society or dining club.
Such a group will have to meet practical problems: pay its bills, and
so on, and its members must treat one another reasonably fairly; such
groups, therefore, require the practical and ethical virtues. But most
of the activity of the group does not fall within the category of the
ethically virtuous or vicious. The members must decide what plays
to put on, what wines to purchase, how to distribute responsibilities
among themselves; most of the answers to such questions are equally
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without the taint of vice. Yet without being moral questions these
are the most urgent questions before the group, for it is in debating
these questions tha t it discovers what sort of group it is, whether the
theater prefers to instruct its audience or to amuse it, whether the
dining club looks on conversation as an adornment to meals or meals
as an adornment to conversation. A man who cannot take effective
part in such controversy is not truly a free man ; therefore the capacity
for action in the community is one of the aims of liberal education.
The primary educator here is the peer-group, and the mode of
learning is participation. Our children a re learning this excellence
from the time they sit down on the floor of the nursery school to
struggle for toys with the other three-year olds. The parents' role--or
the administrators'-can only be to create the setting for the group;
the group must set its own rules if it is to create its own values; and
the group must consist, formally, of equals.
The family and the peer-group are natural enemies; in the same
way education for character and education for action are acrossthe-grain to one another. The family is hierarchical and its t eachings
conservative; the peer-group is equalitarian and its teachings are
radical. The values of the group, being group created, are constantly
in process of recreation, always as it were, contemporary to the group
at tha t moment. Therefore, in the peer-group we feel liberated , "with
it"- in the family, often stifled. On the other hand the peer-group,
because it is essentially competitive, cannot love anyone. If the family
tends to seem old-hat, the peer-group is swept by idle fashions; if
we are to take its enthusiasms seriously we must forget how different
they were a few months ago and how different they will be again in a
few months more. In adolescence we encounter most vividly this conflict of the two standards, we most feel ourselves torn, but the conflict remains a permanent part of our experience, seen, perhaps, in
the conflicting urgencies of the traditional a nd the contemporary, in
the arts; or in politics in the need for authority as against the desirability of wide participation in the decision-making process.
These, then, are two types of liberal education; I promised a
third. This third I associate with the university. The university was
the grea t social invention of the classical period and it has ever since
recrea ted itself by a return to its classical sources; in this sense it is
extremely conservative. Yet the tradition that it exists to conserve is
a radical tradition-secular, skeptical, iconoclastic. The university
thinks of itself as a community of scholars, yet it is organized into an
elaborate hierarchy. The university distrusts authority, distrusts that
which claims to be so simply because it has always claimed to be so;
a t the same time the university distrusts the fashionable, is uneasy
about the contemporary. These paradoxes could be multiplied. They
have something to do, I think, with the fact tha t liberal education in
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a university does not mean education for character nor education for
action; it is not a place where men become decent human beings
nor a place where they become the leaders the na tion requires. Some
third thing goes on among us ; I should like to consider what. I
approach this question indirectly---extremely indirectly- by asking:
what is the role of the teacher in a university education?
One ancient notion is still with us: the notion of the teacher as a
vehicle of learning, a knower to whom the ignorant appeal. In its most
extreme form the teacher may actually be the sole repository of the
text, as in the Indian Vedic schools, where the schola rs transmitted
the Vedas entirely by memory from genera tion to generation. Or if
the text is written the teacher may possess the commentary, as in the
European tradition of classical schola rship, in which much of the lore
of syntactical minutiae and textual variants has been transmitted orally
from scholar to scholar. E ven when the text is written, the teacher
may be a huma n index, able to find in a hundred volumes what, for
example, the Talmud says on this or that point.
The situa tion is much the same when the teacher is the vehicle,
not of fact or theory, but of practical skill. If we go to him for
instruction on how to do this or tha t he is still a vehicle of knowing, a
resource to whom we a ppeal. By this notion the special virtue of the
teacher is the ability to respond to question; he is the man who h as
the answers.
This notion of the teacher is, I think, on the way out; he can be
replaced by a sophisticated informa tion-retrieval system. Soon we
should be able to walk into our libraries and ask the m achine: what
happened at X ; who has written on topic Y ; how do we accomplish
purpose Z? The machine will have all the answers; its print-outs will be
immedia te, accurate, and as good as the questions we put into it.
A second notion is of the teacher as organizer of information, the
man who breaks down the indigestible lumps of knowledge so that
they can be assimilated bit by bit. H ere the teaching machine has a
great future; it is fa r more pa tient than the human drill-master, far
less likely to be distracted by an unattractive personality or a pretty
face . Insofar as educa tion can be reduced to an ordered method of
comprehension and practice it can be effectively mechanized.
A third notion is of the teacher as performer, the m an who m akes
knowledge pala table, even seductive, by the charm of his m anner
and the power of his rhetoric. Here again we await only the perfection
of the media. When the television screen is able to give the student
the sense tha t he is in the actual presence of the teacher, when it h as
been combined with the teaching m achine in such a way as to demand
the attention a nd response of the student, we will be able to immortalize
the great performers of the class room and accumulate their charisma
as a possession for all time, available for immediate recall.
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There is nothing like machinery to clarify a social question. Just
as labor-saving devices have forced us to reflect upon the proper
relation of work and leisu re, so the rise of technology in the classroom
forces us to reflect on the human use of the teacher. We do not face,
I think, much technological unemployment in this generation; the
machinery is too clumsy and too expensive. But it is worth asking:
what can a man do that a machine, even in principle, cannot?
The one thing a machine cannot be is a person ; that is by definition. Therefore we cannot care about machinery as we care about
persons. Nor can a m achine care about us. To use a modish form of
language : the relation between myself and a machine must always
be I-it ; never I-thou.
These days, perhaps because we feel ourselves the victims of ou r
machines, we a re increasingly concerned for the vitality of personal
relations. This concern extends to teaching. In an ea rlier age the
virtue of the teacher lay in knowing, in his command of the subjectm a tter. Today we increasingly value the teacher for caring, for his
commitment to the good of the student. This notion of the teacher's
characteristic excellence began in the progressive elementary schools a t
the turn of the century ; it has gradually seeped up to the colleges. The
famous undergradua te teachers are those who cherish , even love,
their students.
All of us can see the value of this notion of teaching; if a teacher
does not care about his student he has no good reason for teaching him.
If the student does not care about the teacher he is u nlikely to learn
well. E ach of us, I suppose, can remember one or two teachers we
cared about ; these teachers were and are for u s models of aspiration.
In our relations with them we find that we wanted not merely to
know what they knew or to be able to do wha t they could ; we wa nted
also to become what they were. And this aspira tion to become like
the persons we care about is the most important motive for learning;
so it is often said that only by establishing a personal relation with
the student can the teacher motivate the student to learn.
At the same time, most of us are a little bit nervous about this stress
on the personal relation between student and teacher. We are afraid
tha t teaching will suffer if the rela tion becomes quasi-erotic or quasiparental. We do not like teachers who play the Messiah and gather
to themselves disciples ; we distrust the tendency ( in all of us ) to
fla tter the students and so secure their love a nd esteem. The relation
between student and teacher, we think, should not consume their
energies; rather it should liberate energy to the pursuit of learning.
If the relation between student and teacher is erotic it is a kind
of triangle. Student and teacher a re related to one another via their
relation to some third thing, the common object of their study. The
teacher must care about the student, but he m ust also care about
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the subject-ma tter, and if he is to care for the student properly he
must care for the subject-matter even more. Of the student the same
can be said. The subject-matter, being part of the world as it is, has
the opacity and recalcitrance of the world. It presents itself to both
student and teacher as problematic. And this recalcitrance in the
subject matter gives meaning to the relation between student and
teacher. They do not rejoice in one another's company, like lovers ;
rather they submit to the discipline of a common inquiry, as jointly
they attempt to comprehend and to communicate the comprehension
of the partially incomprehensible.
Teaching, therefore, is a complex business; we have to look
several ways a t once. Under the strain of this complexity we have
a tendency to simplify, to reduce the triangle to one of its sides. Either
we reduce it to the relation between teacher and pupil, and look for
good-will and equity, or we reduce it to the rela tion between teacher
and subject-matter, and say that as long as the teacher knows his
stuff he's all right. Or else we reduce it to the relation between
student and subject-matter and d espair of ourselves as teachers ; we
find ourselves saying that some will learn and some won't, and there's
very little we can do about it. But complex situations are not improved
by ignoring their complexity. H ere I want to say something about
one of the most respected styles for approaching the complex teaching
situation: the Socratic.
Socratic teaching is, I think, more talked about than understood;
sometimes I have the impression that people who use the term have
never opened a Platonic dialogue. There is, for example, a widespread
notion tha t because Socrates asks questions he teaches in a permissive
style, that he explores the student's opinions and interests without
imposing his own views. Nothing, of course, could be farther from
the truth. Socrates' questions are all loaded questions and a Socratic
interrogation follows the first rule of forensic cross-examination: never
ask a question to which you do not know the answer. Socratic
teaching is coercive and painful, like being stung, as Meno says, by
a sting-ray.
Secondly, because Socrates talks to one person at a time, there
is a widespread impression that Socratic teaching is shaped by a
concern for the student taught. There is more truth in this idea, but
it is not a simple truth. Certainly Socrates takes no responsibility for
his students; it is Socrates who says, in the Apology:
I have never been anyone's teacher. If someone wanted
to hear me when I was talking and minding my own business I
never begrudged it; ... I offer m yself ... indiscriminately .. .
for questioning, or if some one wants to answer my questions
and so hear what I have to say. And if anyone of those people
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became better or worse, I am not liable to be held to account
for it ...
The Socratic style is impersonal; he will talk to anyone, and he does
not seem to care what results his talk has for the student ; his
concentration is never on the person but on the argument.
On the other hand, Socrates does not have a subject-matter; on
the contrary, he professes himself ignorant. The Socratic style is ironic,
marked by a refusal to explain. As a teacher Socrates seems to have
little going for him; yet he remains for us the teacher par excellence.
Here I wish to examine the Socratic style in some detail, and I
take for my text an early dialogue of Plato: the Lysis. This dialogue is
particularly revealing of Socrates' method because here his interlocutors
are children, without much sophistication and with no developed
position of their own to defend. So the Lysis lacks the element of conflict which we find in most Platonic dialogues ; it is something like
pure teaching, the filling by Socrates of an intellectual void.
The Lysis begins quite casually: Socrates is walking in the suburbs
of Athens when he falls in with some men, one of whom, Hippothales,
invites Socrates to come into a recently-built wrestling-ground and
join the conversation there. There is a good deal of teasing talk in
the street, in the course of which it appears that Hippothales is
head-over-heels in love with one of the boys who frequents the
wrestling-ground, a beautiful child named Lysis. Hippothales is always
praising Lysis and composing songs in his honor. Socrates finds
fault with Hippothales' tactics:
A man who is skilled in matters of love, my friend, does not
praise his beloved before he has captured him . . . The
beautiful, when they are praised and built up, become infected
with pride and vainglory . .. and the more vainglorious they
are, the harder to catch ... What sort of hunstman, do you
think, would rouse his prey and make it harder to capture? ...
If you are prepared to bring me into conversation with him
I might be able to give you a demonstration of the kind of
conversation which will work, rather than the talk and poetry
they say you are using.
Upon entering the wrestling ground, Socrates is introduced to
Lysis and his friend Menexenus, another boy of twelve or thirteen years.
They talk for a moment, and Menexenus goes· off. Socrates begins his
demonstration :
Well now Lysis, I suppose your father and your mother love
you very much?
Certainly.
So they want you to be as happy as you can be?
Oh yes.
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Do you think a man is happy when he is in servitude and
cannot do anything which he wants to do?
I should think not, absolutely.
Now I suppose that if your father and mother love you and
want you to be happy it must absolutely follow that they make
every effort to see that you are happy.
Of course.
So they allow you to do what you want, and they never
restrain you or prevent you from doing what you wish?
Good lord, Socrates, in my case, they prevent me all the time.
What's that you say? They want you to be happy and then
prevent you from doing what you want? Let's take an example.
Suppose you want to drive one of your father's chariots and
take over the reins, in a race, I mean, wouldn't he permit you;
would he prevent you?
There's no question about it; he'd never let me.
Whom does he allow, then?
We have a charioteer at our house who's paid for that.
What's that? They allow one of the servants to do something
they won't let you do, when it comes to horses, and pay him
well?
But what else would they do?
"Do your parents love you?" "Do they let you do what you want?"
"Can anyone be happy when they can't do what they want?" It is
hard to think of any questions more likely to catch in the mind of an
adolescent boy. Socrates begins with the student where he is, with
the questions which concern him. On the other hand, the tone is
playful and the concern does not go beyond the surface of the question.
Socrates does not go into the empirical question and ask whether
Lysis' parents really do love him; neither does he explore the moral
question of the relation between happiness and liberty. He does not
act as either therapist or pastoral counsellor. Instead he gives the
argument a twist. After several more examples of how Lysis' parents
restrict and hamper him Socrates asks:
But why is it that they hinder you so dreadfully from being
happy and doing what you want, and keep you all day in
servitude to someone and, in brief, doing almost nothing you
wish-so that apparently, you have all this money and it's of
no use to you; nor is your body, fine as it is, but someone is
always shepherding you around and looking after you ...
I'm not yet of age, Socrates.
That cannot be the explanation, son of Democritus, since
here is a case where, I would guess, your father and your mother
give you liberty and do not wait for you to come of age. When
they want to be read to or for someone to write at their
dictation you are the first person in the house they ask. Isn't
that so?
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Yes.
And in this case you can write whichever letter you want
first and whichever second. And you h ave the same liberty in
reading. And when you pick up the lyre, your father and mother
don't hinder you from tuning and untuning any string you
want, and from strumming a nd striking with the plectrum.
Or do they hinder you?
No they don't.
Now just why would it be, Lysis for wha t reason do they
allow you liberty here, whereas in those other cases they
prevent you?
Well I suppose because I know how to do these things, but
these other things I don't.
Ah, excellent, my friend .
Socrates h as proposed to Lysis a problem, and h as put him into a
position to come up with an answer: we have liberty to do wha t we
know how to do. Since they have agreed ea rlier tha t liberty is a
necessary condition of happiness, the solution to Lysis' problem leads
directly to one of the basic Socratic paradoxes: That knowledge is
h appiness. It seems that the dialogue is about to become serious.
Socrates, however, does not take this turn. He goes straight back
to Lysis' situa tion:
So it turns out that your father isn't waiting for you to be of
age in order to turn everything over to you, but on the d ay
when he thinks you have more sense than he has he will turn
over to you himself and his property.
I suppose so.
Well then. In your neighbor's case, does not the sa me
principle apply . .. Don't you think h e will turn his property
over to you for management of property that he has, or will h e
look after it himself?
I guess he'll turn it over to me.
W ell, a nd the Athenians, don' t you think they'll turn their
affairs over when they notice you have sense enough?
I do .
. . . What about the Great King? Will he allow his eldest
son, to whom the rule of Asia belongs, to throw what he wa nts
into the pot when he is making a stew, or if we come by and
demonstrate that we know more about stew-cooking than his
son?
He will allow us, obviously.
What if his son has sick eyes, will he allow him to touch his
own eyes if he thinks he has no medical knowledge, or will he
prevent him?
He will prevent him.
But if he thinks we h ave medical knowledge, even if we
want to hold his eyes open and throw in ashes, he will not
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prevent us because he will think we know best.
That's true.
That's the way it is, Lysis. In those matters where we h ave
become sensible, everyone will turn them over to us, Greeks
and barbarians, men and women, and we will do in those cases
whatever we want . .. we will be free and rulers over others,
and those things will be ours- for we will get the good of
them-but in cases where we are not intelligent, no one will
allow us to do what we think best in these cases, but they will
prevent us insofar as they are able, not only strangers, but
even our fathers and mothers and if there is anyone closer to
us tha n this ; in those cases we will be subject to others and
our property will not be our own- for we will get no good of
it. Do you agree with that position?
I agree.
And I .. . (says Socrates glancing toward Hippothales ) ...
and I was about to say: Tha t is the way, Hippothales, to
converse with your beloved, humbling and abasing him ; not
in your style, glorifying him and giving him an inflated idea
of himself ...
Wha t happens to Lysis in the course of this a rgument? He
is presented with a rea l problem, encouraged to reach a sketch
of a solution, and then that solution is reduced to absurdity.
H e has been humbled, lowered, subjected to Socrates. Socrates
does this with so much elegance and charm, however, that
Lysis does not become angry. On the contrary: Socrates
accomplished the seduction of Lysis.
At that point Menexenus came back and sa t down by Lysis
.. . Lysis, very childishly and affectionately, in a voice Menexenus could not hear whispered to me:
Socrates, wha t you were saying to me, say that to Menexenus
as well.
And I said: you will say it to him, Lysis; for you paid close
attention.
Yes indeed, he said.
Try to remember the whole as best you can, so that you can
say it clearly. If you forget any of it, ask me again the very
first time we meet.
I will, Socrates, I'll be sure to, no question. But say something else to him, so I can hear it, until it's time to go away.
Well, that's what we'll do, I said, since you tell me to. But
be ready to come to my help, if Menexenus tries to refute me.
Don't you know what an arguer he is?
Oh yes indeed I certainly do. That's why I want you to
converse with him.
So as to m ake me a laughing stock?
No, Indeed , but so that you can be hard on him.
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Socrates' first argument with Lysis is based on a paradox: that people
will allow us to do what we know how to do. This paradox is developed by a trick familiar to Socrates : the technical expert is taken
as the p aradigma tic knower, and the liberty extended to the technical
expert in the exercise of his mystery is made the p aradigm of liberty.
Because Lysis does not recognize Socrates' jump from the special case
to the general application he is led into absurdities.
The process a ttracts Lysis to Socrates because in the course of it
Socra tes exercises power over Lysis. Socrates, who claims to know
nothing about anything (except love ), knows how to dominate others
in a rgument, and also knows tha t such dominion is attractive. Power
is inherently attractive, and is, furth ermore, transferable. Socrates'
paradox can be learned, and used by the lea rner on others. So L ysis
is seduced, not so much by Socra tes, as by Socrates' power of argument; he sees that these arguments are valu able to him and therefeore
he has a motive for lea rning them.
So far Socrates has taught Lysis nothing but sophistry. In the
next conversation- between Socrates and Menexenus- Lysis' education
is carried a stage further.
This argument is impossible to translate, as it is based on the
ambiguity of the Greek work philos. That which is the object of our
affection can be called philos, or dear ; a person who cares for some
object or person can be called philos to it, or devoted ; two persons
rela ted by a bond of mutual good-will are called philoi, or friends. By
playing these three meanings off against one another Socrates h as
no difficulty in showing that no defini tion of philos is adequa te to all
its uses, and tha t any definition will lead us into absurdity when we
apply it to some uses of the word. Socrates concludes to M enexenus:
So what a re we to do if the befrienders a re not friends,
nor are the befriended, nor a re those who are both befriending
and befriended? Are there any others beyond these whom we
m ay call friends to one another ?
God only knows, Socrates; I don't know what to say next.
Well then, M enexenus : were we seeking in quite the wrong
way?
I should think so, Socrates, said Lysis-and a t the moment
of speaking he blushed. I thought the remark had escaped him
against his will, due to the close a ttention he was paying to the
a rgument. For even while he was listening his sta te of mind was
clear.
So then I . . . , delighted with his philosophic temper,
turned toward Lysis and took up the argument ...
Lysis has asked Socrates to turn his sophistries on Menexenus,
so tha t he can enjoy the spectacle of Menexenus' discomforture. But
as Socrates talks Lysis becomes fascinated by the argument-not by
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its effect but by its inherent self-contradiction. He has ceased to be
interested in the persons and has become involved in the logos, the
pattern of discourse. So great is his involvement that when he speaks
and becomes aware of himself as a person, surrounded by other
persons, he blushes. This blush is the mark of Lysis' conversion from
sophistry to philosophy.
The second half of the Lysis is more interesting philosophically
but less germane to our purpose. In it Socrates examines the meaning
of friendship in terms of familiar Socratic commonplaces; same and
other; the good as the useful versus the good as admirabie. Without
the second half the dialogue would be incomplete: the conversion
to philosophy would be pointless if philosophy had no content, and
the Socratic commonplaces are themselves that content. But here I
am not talking about Socrates' philosophy, but about Socrates' approach to the student, and about that enough has been said.
We often find it hard to translate the Socratic style so that it means
something to us in our own situation as teachers. It seems that the
Socratic method may be appropriate for moral or metaphysical controversy, but that it is irrelevant to teachers of history, say, or
languages, or chemistry. I believe the Socratic style can work in
any kind of teaching; I will here try to translate it into terms which
make sense to us where we are.
The translation is difficult because the Socratic dialogue starts,
not from subject-matter but from the teacher. Lysis has not registered
with Socrates for a course on friendship. They simply fall into conversation ; it is up to Socrates to find something for them to talk
about. Our teaching begins from subject-matter; the students come
to us to learn something in particular. Nevertheless we have the same
three problems: we have to begin with the students where they are,
we have to offer them something which is useful to them, and
thirdly we h ave to show them something more. And this "something
more" justifies the whole enterprise.
Beginning with the student where he is does not mean that the
Socratic teacher starts from the student's hang-ups. On the contrary
the process of the Socratic teacher is exactly opposite to that of the
psychotherapist. The psychotherapist starts from the patient's problems
and shows that they make a certain kind of sense-"! can't get on
with my mother and I can't study"-"Perhaps you are trying to
flunk out of school because you think that's what your mother really
wants." The Socratic teacher starts from the student's certainties and
shows them to be problematic-"Do your parents want you to be
happy?" "Of course." "Do they let you do what you want?" Socratic
teaching creates problems where none were before, by showing the
student that he does not know what he thinks he knows.
Take language teaching, for example. The student who under59

takes a foreign language intends to learn to transla te it into English
and this we can teach him- by machine, if we are well equipped .
But translation is problematic, because wha t can be said in one
language cannot exactly be said in another. And since speakers of
all languages live in the same world , the impossibility of saying the
same thing in two languages means that, in a sense, tha t thing cannot
really be said in either. The Socra tic teacher of la nguages uses the teaching of the technique of transla tion as a n occasion for reflecting upon
the impossibility of translation and so for reflection upon the problem of meaning- not as a generic question but as a problem recurring
in a multitude of specific cases.
Or take the case of imagina tive literature. Anyone who has read
it with reasonable attention knows wha t happens in a given scene
of H amlet. H amlet, for example, does something. But it is also true
tha t in production an actor does something, and wha t the actor
does is not wha t H amlet does. And Shakespeare also did something
and what he did is in fac t the scene of H amlet doing something. All
these doi ngs are going on a t the same time, and the relation between
them is problema tic. Tha t is pa rt of the problematic of imi tative
a rt. So wha t the student thought he understood is more complicated
than he thought, and what looked like a fac t is the beginning of a n
inquiry.
Beginning with the student where he is implies a prior diagnostic :
the Socratic teacher must discover wha t the student alread y thinks
he understa nds. Since everyone understands something no special
prepara tion is required of the student. But a great deal is required of
the teacher. H e does not merely follow the student's line of thought
in a non-directive style; he takes hold of the student, in the Pla tonic
metaphor, and turns him a round. H e involves the student in a n
unexpected line of inquiry. Tha t is what the teacher is there for. Thus
it is not enough for the teacher to know the subject as an encyclopedia
knows the subj ect ; the teacher m ust also know the problematic of
the subj ect, and know it with enough particula rity to m ake the subject problematic for the student. Since the pa rticular form which the
problema tic will take in a particula r conversation is unpredictable,
since it arises only in the contact between two intellects a t a pa rticula r
moment, Socratic teaching cannot be carried on by m achine.
By beginning with the student where he is the Socratic teacher
establishes a personal rela tion with the student. By taking the student
in an unexpected direction the Socra tic teacher establishes his superiority to the student; the rela tion between teacher a nd student is a
hierarchical rela tion. The teacher becomes a model for imitation; the
student tries to learn to do what the teacher does, a nd so the student
tries to master the problematic of the subject. Thus, the studen t,
while he is learning something, is a t the same time learning to think
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about that something; he is acqumng knowledge and at the same
time developing an intellectual virtue. And the teacher is something
like a parent.
For learning to take place, however, it is not enough that there
be something to be learned; the student must also want to learn it.
Thus we find ourselves saying that it is not enough for the teacher
to instruct; he must also motivate the student. We motivate students in
various ways. We build around education a system of rewards and
punishments-grades, degrees, honors, probation, expulsion, the promise of employment and the disgrace of failure. These are more or
less effective, but they are external to the process of education itself
and-particularly these days-young people are quite capable of
avoiding our particular sanctions by denying the validity of the whole
system. If they do not wish to be employed and they don't mind
being disgraced we cannot use rewards and punishments to induce
them to become educated.
The personal relation between teacher and student, as I said, may
motivate the student; if the teacher is an attractive person the student
will want his approval, and want to be like him. The danger here
is that the student will become a disciple, that he will merely imitate
his master. Since the imitation is always a reduced version of the
original, generations of discipleship imply a steady decline in quality.
The Socratic teacher observes that the life of the mind is both
personal and social; education is something that happens to a man
and also something that goes on in a group. So the Socratic teacher
puts the students in touch with one another and shows them that their
learning is of use in the life of the group. He encourages the students
to criticize one another's work and to teach one another. Thus the
students become a peer-group, an arena for controversy and cooperation. Thus the student is introduced to the community of scholars,
a community where quickness of mind and subtlety of insight means
power and status, and education, not for its rewards but in itself is
a way to the respect of our neighbors. When education becomes a
mode of action in society it is a way of being alive and its own
institution.
The Socratic teacher, therefore, tries to build a community of
discourse. A group discussion-which is moderated rather than
directed by the instructor-is such a community, sometimes intense,
always evanescent. A seminar to which students contribute formal
papers is a larger version; a whole college can, at certain moments,
become such a community. I myself have some experience of a
staff course taught both by graduate students and by senior faculty;
here the staff has developed into a community of discourse. We are
not, perhaps, as successful as we could be in putting our student in
touch with discourse outside a particular University as the law schools
do, for example, with the Law Review.
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The danger here, of course, is that discourse becomes a game.
degenerates, in Socratic la nguage, from philosophy to sophistry.
Learning which is merely a mode of relating to the peer-group is
frivolous- as learning which merely seeks the approval of our elders
is frivolous. The relation between inquirers, as was said, is not a
personal relation; the persons are related by way of some third thing.
The presence of this third thing makes inquiry serious.
But after this discussion we can no longer think of this third thing
as the subject-matter. Subject-matter is present at every stage ; students
are always learning something, talking about something. The Socratic
style does not concern itself with the object of inquiry but with the
condition of the inquirer; the source of seriousness is some principle
which transcends the personal stance of student and teacher in relation
to the subject-matter at hand.
This third thing is the discipline of inquiry-what Socrates calls
the logos. Of every inquiry there is a discipline, a propriety of discourse,
a logic, grammar, and rhetoric, if I may use the familiar Chicago
triad. A language, for example, is not simply a given phenomenon,
lucid to any sort of question. It is a phenomenon which must be
questioned in a way appropriate to it; we will go wrong, for instance,
if we treat a language as a work of art, as something planned; on the
other hand (since language is a human phenomenon ) we will equally
go wrong if we treat it as an object in nature, like a tree. Nor can
we properly treat Hamlet as a political act or as a work of psychological
theory. What Wayne Booth has said of art applies to all subj ects of
inquiry. Booth says: you can ask any questions about a work of
literature, but you must ask them in the right order. This ordering
of questions is the discipline of our inquiry.
The intellectual disciplines are the special responsibility of the
universities. Culture through its history has constantly created new
disciplines-mathematics, theology, aesthetics, psychoanalysis-and as
these become established they become part of the order of disciplines
which the university includes. Here these cultural forms are maintained, not as dead bodies of data, but in a living tradition of inquiry.
If it were not for the universities, liberal education in the intellectual
disciplines would not exist.
The personal relations between teacher and student, between student and student, give education its vitality and warmth. The disciplines are impersonal, trans-historical, and cool. The right way of
speaking remains the same, whether we like it or not; logic is not
subject to fashions and grammar cannot be remade by political fiat.
Furthermore, the discipline is something we both know and don't
know. Since the discipline constitutes the standard of excellence for
the inquiry it is not encountered in our immediate experience or
inquiry. The discipline stands behind the material activity as the
form to which it aspires.
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The disciplines, because they are impersonal, are the source of
individuality in the intellectual life. The student can go beyond his
master because he finds in his master's work a rough sketch of the
discipline which the master, like the student, is seeking to realize. In
Socratic language the student imitates the master, not in servile
imitation of the master's actual activity, but in constructive imitation of the form of tha t activity. When the student sees through
the master to the discipline he ceases to be trapped in a position of
discipleship and becomes an independent inquirer.
In the same way the discipline, because it transcends the here
and now, liberates us from the constraints of the group. The members
of a community of discourse do not merely seek status within that
community; they also seek, through controversy and cooperation, to
make the discourse of the community adequa te to the discipline. When
the student sees through the community to the discipline he ceases
to be simply a member of the community and becomes one of its
legislators. So no contribution to discourse, no scholarly work or
critical essay, can be truly serious if it takes the existing tradition of
inquiry for granted; every serious work attempts to remake the tradition of inquiry in the image of its own potential excellence.
So the disciplines, just because they are independent of ourselves
and of our situations, enable us to discover ourselves in our situation.
Just as the infant can have no conception of himself until he understands that he occupies a world composed of objects which are not
himself, objects a rranged in an order over which he has no control, so
also the inquirer can have no sense of his own inquiry until he
understands it vis-a-vis an order of inquiry not peculiar to himself
or to his times. That is the special liberation which the universities,
at their best, can offer ; the task of the teacher is to help the student
to look through the here-and-now to the enduring order latent in it.
In so doing he helps the student achieve the particular form of
excellence characteristic of intellectuals. Socrates spoke of this characteristic excellence as self-knowledge; he said that he sought it,
not by private brooding on his passions, but by following, with his
friends, the logos where it led him.
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